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Abstract
The paper is concerned with the impact of market research prior to integration, on
the structures of noncompetitive industries in integrated economy. The analysis focuses
on separated, single commodity, monopolistic markets with stochastic demand.
Monopolistic firms are considered in dynamic multiperiod model, where intertemporal
links are determined by expenditures on market research in a present period and benefits
from this activity (i.e., smaller variance of the prediction error) in the future. Assuming
that each firm maximizes its total discounted expected utility from profit in indefinite
time, we show that the optimal market research strategy is stationary and depends on
market size. Consequently, in the period following integration firms operating prior to
integration in small markets (such as Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary or Estonia) are
expected to have much less information about the integrated market than their
competitors operating before integration on European market. This informational
asymmetry may affect the structure of the industry in integrated economy. In the
extreme case, the firm operating before integration in the small market can be ruled out
from the integrated market. 
Keywords: European integration, demand uncertainty, industry structures,
asymmetric information, demand forecasting, barriers for entry 
JEL Classification:  F150, D800, L100
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1. Introduction
The end of the cold war and the rapid political and economic transformation of the
majority of former socialist countries has created a basis for the gradual formation of
modern democratic societies. In some countries such as Poland, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia the basic stage of economic transformation
(macroeconomic stabilization, restructuring, change in ownership structure, etc.) was
completed by the middle of nineties. Success of the transformation of Eastern European
societies has created an entirely new situation for the European Union (EU), where we
could observe two, to some extend contradictionary [1], tendencies: to deepen the
community of European countries and to expand the EU. Finland, Sweden and Austria
joined EU in 1995, however, the target solution is considered to be the admittance of the
following countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Cyprus. Therefore, gradual enlargement of European
Community can be undoubtedly expected. In few years firms from Eastern Europe will
start to enter on a larger scale into various economic relationships (market competition,
joint venture, licensing, foreign direct investment, etc.) with their Western European
counterparts. All of these will have significant impact on market structure of integrated
economy.
In the present paper, we intend to show that behavior of the firms in pre-integration
period may affect the structure of the industry in integrated economy. In particular, we
want to show that, under demand uncertainty, informational asymmetry between firms
resulting from their past behavior will result in cost advantage of firms operating before
integration in European market over their competitors from entering countries. 
Since in real life firms are never sure about a number of variables characterizing
market environment such as factor prices, or the exact shape of demand curve [see, e.g.,
Nelson, 1961; and Ghosal, 1996], we focus on firms operating in the market with
uncertain demand. Economic research shows that uncertainty of demand can change the
basic predictions of economic theory under certainty. The basic conclusions concerning
the behavior of firms operating in markets with uncertain demand have been presented
by Sandmo (1971), Leland (1972) and Lim (1980). In most of those papers, the firms'
beliefs about demand are summarized in a subjective probability distribution, which
cannot be changed by the firms' actions. The fact that the firm may be able to predict
changes in demand, or at least to decrease the range of possible variations, is usually
neglected in the standard studies of economic behavior under uncertainty. Nevertheless,
[1] Note that the more "integrated" the present EU becomes, more difficult the admission of new
members will be. 
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the ability of the firm to predict demand, although not always perfect, may affect not only
a number of parameters of economic equilibrium [see, e.g., Nelson, 1961], but also the
structure of the industry. 
In the analysis which follows we focus on two separated single commodity
markets for the same product and we assume that in both markets the relationship
between quantities demanded and market prices randomly varies from period to
period, and that demand analysis is both costly and time consuming. In particular, we
focus on markets where the total demand originates from a large (but finite) number
of sources. The demand curve in each individual source changes randomly from period
to period, but in any time period changes of demand are assumed to be correlated
with the changes prior to this period, reflecting a certain inertness in consumer
behavior. Since information gathering and data processing requires time, the sum of
individual demands (i.e., the total demand) cannot be instantaneously determined. In
particular, we assume that the results of the market analysis are available only after the
end of the period. Thus, the firms' output-price decisions have to be made based not
on the true demand but on its prediction. In each period the profit-maximizing firms
set their volumes of output, since it has a high commitment value within a period of
time (i.e., the output decisions are irreversible within the time unit). The price is
assumed to be more flexible and can change due to real market conditions. However,
firms operating in the market are still assumed to be unable to learn the true demand
function during the period of time, and, consequently, have to rely only on the results
of the demand analysis [2]. Since demand forecasts are based on past data, a
prediction error appears, and, consequently, firm's output decisions always deviate
from what is optimal. 
Note that better predictions resulting in smaller variance of current demand make
the firm's output decisions close to optimal, but on the other hand, they induce additional
costs (more resources have to be devoted to market research in the firm). Consequently,
the selection of the optimal demand forecasting strategy faces the traditional cost-benefit
trade off problem.
In the present paper we intent to show that the optimal amount of resources devoted
to market research is proportional to the market size (i.e., firms operating in larger
market devote more resources to market analysis than firms operating in smaller one),
what implies that firms operating in different markets (before integration) will have
different information about the consolidated market just after integration (in particular,
the firm operating in larger market will have much more information about integrated
[2] Note that by allowing for a small price adjustment, we avoid the problem of inventories and any
potential losses connected with them (see Zabel, 1970, for an analysis of the behavior of the firm in a
multiperiod model with inventories).
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market than a firm operating in the smaller one). Resulting informational asymmetry may
affect the industry structure in the integrated market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Uncertainty of demand and basic principles of
demand forecasting are characterized in Section 2. Section 3 provides an analysis of the
optimal demand forecasting strategy in the monopolistic firm operating in the single
commodity market. The implication of the size of the market on the scope of market
research is presented in Section 4. Section 5 explores how market research strategies
prior to integration may affect industry structure in the integrated market. The
concluding section summarizes some of the major findings of the study.
2. Forecasting Market Demand
Consider a single commodity market where total demand originates from a large
number of identical sources N (one can think of these sources as retail outlets or
consumers). Suppose that demand in each individual source i (i=1,2, ..., N) at any period
of time t (t is an integer number, -∞<t<+∞) is linear with an additive random term ηi,t
(for the sake of simplicity, assume that random variables ηi,t are identically distributed
with zero mean and finite variance σi,t2=σt2), i.e., inverse demand in source i (i=1,2, ...,
N) at any period of time t is characterized as
(1)
where a and b are positive constants. Total inverse demand at period t is
(2)
where                         is the total quantity demanded at price Pt (Pt≥0). The random
variables ηi,t can move up or down in response to changes in the variables omitted from
a correct demand specification, such as, for instance, interest rates, inflation, personal
income, prices of other goods, etc. Much of this movement, however, might be due to
factors, which are hard to capture, such as, for example, changes in the weather or in
consumer tastes. Thus, in many cases it may be difficult (or even impossible) to explain
fluctuations in demand through the use of a structural model. Moreover, it might happen
that, even if statistically significant regression equations can be estimated, the result will
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[3] In general, specifications of stochastic processes describing individual demands should also include a
"common noise" which could reflect aggregate demand shocks (i.e., which could equally affect all sources of
demand), but to simplify the exposition we will disregard this common component.
[4] Similar structure of demand has been assumed by Radner and Van Zandt (1992).
not be useful for forecasting purposes (for example, when explanatory variables which
are not lagged must themselves be forecasted). In such situations, an alternative means
of obtaining predictions of ηi,t have to be used. The easiest way is to predict changes in
ηi,t based on the analysis of their movements in the past. Such forecasts, however, are
possible only if the random variables ηi,t are observable and if they are correlated with
their previous values. 
To simplify the analysis, assume that random deviations from the expected values of
individual demands ηi,t (i=1,2,...,N) are independent [3] and described by identical
stationary stochastic processes with a memory (e.g., by autoregressive processes of any
order) [4]. In other words, assume that for any individual demand, variances and
covariances of random variables ηi,t are invariant with respect to displacement in time
(note that, by definition, mean values of random variables ηi,t are equal to zero,
E(ηi,t)=0), i.e., Var(ηi,t)=Var(ηi)=σ2>0, and Cov(ηi,tηi,t+s)≠0, for s=0,1,..., i=1,2,...,N,
and integer valued t (-∞<t<+∞). 
Since immediate computations are not possible and the firm's output-price decisions
have to be made prior to the knowledge of the market price, the result computed in
period t can be used only in subsequent periods, i.e., deviations
can be estimated based on the results computed in the past, and, consequently, always
with certain error. It has to be stressed, however, that the variance of the error in the
estimation increases with the time elapsed from observations of individual demands to
the moment when decisions are made [see Radner and Van Zandt, 1992, for a
discussion]. Therefore, the producer faces not only the rather standard problem of
finding appropriate estimations of demand but also the problem of finding the optimal
cost of these estimations, since data processing is inherently costly and the acquisition
and analysis of more pieces of information (and in particular, more recent information)
has to be weighed against the increasing costs of such an endeavor.
In general, the firm may find it advantageous to compute in subsequent periods (say,
t-m, m=1,2,...) deviations from the mean values of random variables ηi,t-m coming from
different subsets of sources (say, St-m, m=1,2,...) and use them for the estimation of the
∑
=
=
N
1i
tit ,ηη
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total deviation from the expected demand in period t (rational strategy requires that
sources of demand should be analyzed cyclically one after the other) [5].
Denote the results computed in subsequent periods as                          . If the
subsets                               contain ηt-m,...,ηt-1 (ηt-m>0,..., ηt-1>0) sources of individual 
demand, then there exits integer number K (N≥K≥1) such that
Thus, the estimation of total deviation       can be computed as
, (3)
where            is a forecast (for period t) of the sum of the deviations from the mean values
of random variables coming from the sources included in the set St-m (m=1,2,..,K+1). 
Since all the available predictions of partial deviations (       , m=1,2,..,K+1) can be
represented as linear combinations of the true values of corresponding partial deviations
in the past, the expected error in the prediction of total deviation equals zero.
Furthermore, its variance (assuming that deviations from the expected values of individual
demands, ηi,t, are independent, identically distributed, and time invariant) is
, (4)
where
is the variance of the error in the estimation (with lag m, m=1,2,…,K+1) of the deviation
of random variable ηi,t (i=1,2,…,N) from its mean value, and             denotes the
estimation with lag m (m=1,2,…,K+1) of the deviation of random variable ηi,t
(i=1,2,…,N) from its mean value.
The forecast of the inverse demand can be specified as  
where                                  denotes the expected demand curve in period t(-∞<t<+∞).
The prediction error equals     /N , where      is given by (3) and its variance       by (4).
[5] See Cukrowski (1996) for details.
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3. Optimal Behavior of the Monopolistic Firm
Taking into account that the variability of demand decreases the quality of output-
price decisions (i.e., price-output decisions deviate from the optimal decision that would
be made if the variance were equal to zero) and that the results of demand analysis can
be used only after the end of the period in which they were computed, the smallest
variance of the prediction error corresponds to the case when all sources of demand are
analyzed in the preceding period. The analysis of the total demand in each period,
however, requires a number of economic resources to be devoted to data-processing in
the firm, i.e., it induces significant costs that cannot always be offset by the expected
benefit from the output-price decision with a lower risk of error. Thus, instead of
examining the demand coming from all sources in each period, the firm can sequentially
analyze the demand coming from certain subsets of sources. In this case, however, the
firm has to determine the optimal number of sources of demand that should be analyzed
in subsequent periods.
Consider two firms: a monopolistic firm operating in large market (L) with NL sources
of demand, and a monopolistic firm operating in small market (S) with NS sources of
demand (NL>>NS). Suppose that both firms under consideration are managed according
to the wishes of their owners who are typical asset holders, and the decisions in each firm
are made by a group of decision-makers with sufficiently similar preferences to guarantee
the existence of a group-preference function, representable by a von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function. Given these conditions assume risk aversion, so that utility
functions of both firms (Ux , where x ∈{L,S}) are concave functions of profits. The
objective of the firms is to maximize the expected utility from profit (we assume that the
firms set the volume of output supplied).
Assuming that each firm is able to predict demand and taking into account that the
life of the firm is unlimited, the optimization task of the firm x (x∈{L,S}) can be
represented as the following infinite-horizon, discounted, dynamic programming
problem:
(6)
where σx,t+1 = f(σx,t,nx,t), with σx,0=σ0= (Nxω
2)1/2,
E is an expectation operator,
Ux(.) denotes the utility function of the firm (x∈{L,S}),
Πx,t(.) is the profit of the firm in the period t, t=0,1,..., (x∈{L,S}),
 ,}]  ),,Q( [U {  max
t
txtxtxtxx
t
tx, nQ tx
∑ Π
∞
=0
,,,,
,,
ησβ E
Qx,t is a quantity supplied by the firm x (x∈{L,S}) in the period t, t=0,1,...,
nx,t denotes the number of individual sources of demand analyzed in firm
x (x∈{L,S}) in the period t, t=0,1,...,
σx,t is the standard deviation of the error in the prediction of the total deviation
of the random variables ηi,t (i=1,2,...,Nx) in firm x (x∈{L,S}) in the 
period t, t=0,1,...,
Nx is the total number of sources of demand, facing by firm x (x∈{L,S}), 
ω2 is the variance of the stochastic process underlying each individual demand 
around its mean,
β is the discount factor, β∈(0,1).
Assuming that all the parameters of the model are stationary over time, the optimal
solution to an infinite-horizon, discounted, dynamic programming problem is time-
invariant [see, e.g., Sargent, 1987]. Thus, in the problem considered, the optimal output
and demand-predicting strategy is stationary, i.e., Qx,0
*=Qx,1
*=Qx,2
*=...=Qx
* and
nx,0
*=nx,1
*=nx,2
*=...=nx
* (x∈{L,S}). This implies that the optimal value of the standard
deviation (σx
*) of the error in the prediction of the total deviation of the random variables
ηi,t (i=1,2,...,N) from their means is stationary and depends only on the number of
individual demands analyzed in each period, σx
*=σx(nx
*). It follows that the unique one-
period cost of data-processing can be related to each value of the standard deviation
σx(nx
*), i.e., the costs of data processing in each period can be represented as a function
of the standard deviation in the steady state.
Assume, for simplicity, that a standard deviation is the following function of the cost
of data processing σx =σx,0 e
-λGx, where Gx is a total cost of data processing, and λ (λ>0)
is a parameter describing the current state of information processing technology.
Consequently, for any σx <σx,0 , the cost of data processing is specified as Gx (σx)=
=-(lnσx -lnσx,0)/λ.
The consideration above shows that the optimization problem of the firm x (x∈{L,S})
can be solved in two steps. First, the optimal quantity Qx
* and the optimal value of
standard deviation σx
* can be determined, and, second, knowing σx
*, the optimal size of
the cohorts of data summarized in each period can be found.
Thus, in the first stage the firm x (x∈{L,S})  chooses the steady-state quantity of
output Qx and the value of the standard deviation σx which maximize the following
objective function
(7)
To simplify the analysis, assume that the steady-state error in prediction of the total
demand is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance σx
2 (this
12
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Q ,x σ
σ
x
max E{U [ (Q )]} x x x xΠ , .
corresponds to the case when random deviations follow stochastic processes with
normally distributed random terms such as, for example, the autoregressive process of
any order) [6]. Since the distribution of the total random deviation from the mean value
of demand is normal, the total deviation can take positive or negative values, each having
probability 1/2 (the expected value of positive deviation equals                         , and the
expected value of negative deviation equals                           [7]. Consequently, the total 
inverse random demand in any period t (−∞<t<+∞) can be approximated as 
where is a random factor (not 
known ex-ante) which with probability 1/2 equals γNx(σx) and with probability 1/2 equals 
-γNx(σx), where γNx(σx)= . Consequently, one can say that with probability 
1/2 an inverse market demand is , and with
probability 1/2 is .   The expected market
demand curve is determined as 
Using this approximation, the optimization problem of firm x (x∈{L,S}) can be
represented as 
(8)
where and
denotes a cost
function of the firm x. 
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[6] It should be stressed that, although the assumption of the normal distribution of the random deviations
from the expected demand corresponds to the wide class of stochastic processes that would govern stochastic
demand, it is chosen solely for simplicity and clarity, and no attempt is made at generality. We believe, however,
that many of the qualitative results would hold also in more general, and, consequently, more complicated
models. 
[7] Expected values of positive and negative deviations are computed as 
and , respectively.
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4. Informational asymmetry
Assume that the cost function of firm x (x∈{L,S}) is Fx(Qx,σx)=cQx+Gx(σx), where Qx
denotes the volume of output produced, Gx(σx) denotes the cost of data processing, c is
the marginal cost (for the sake of simplicity we assume that fixed cost equals to zero).
Moreover, to simplify the analysis assume that the exact shape of the utility function Ux is
specified as follows: 
(9)
where u1> u2>0  and [8].
The interior solution to the optimization problem (8) exists if 
(10)
(see Appendix A1 for details).
Assuming that the primitives of the model: a,b,Nx,c,λ satisfy the condition above, the
optimal steady state values of the volume of output supplied Qx
* and the standard
deviation of the demand σx
*, are determined as
(11)
(12)
where k=(u1 - u2)/(u1 + u2), k∈(0,1) for the risk averse firm [9] (see Appendix A1 for the
proof).
Since σx
* is inversely related to Nx, just after integration of two separated markets the
firms under consideration (even if they have the same cost structures) will have different
knowledge about demand in the integrated market (the firm operating in the large
market will have much better position after integration than its competitor). 
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[8] Note that a function defined is concave and twice differentiable if Πx∈(-∞,∞)\Πx0.
[9] Coefficient k characterises the attitude towards risk and increases with risk aversion.
5. Industry Structure in an Integrated Market
Assume that in the period following integration both firms produce the same product,
have the same production and information processing cost structure, and face the same
demand conditions. In particular, assume that the total inverse market demand is given by
expression (2), where N (N=NL+ NS) denotes the size of the integrated market (as
before, it is assumed that both firms know the form of the demand function and the
characteristics of the stochastic processes underlying demand in its sources). Moreover,
the attitude of both firms toward risk is characterized by the same utility function
specified by (9). Therefore, the firms are identical, however, they have different
knowledge about an integrated market accumulated in the past. 
After the integration of two separated markets into a single market with N=NL+ NS
sources of demand both firms have to find their new steady state strategies, taking into
account an optimal strategy of the competitor (i.e., to consider the standard problem of
Cournot doupoly). Following the preceding section, the optimization problem of the firm
x (x∈{L,S}) operating in integrated market can be represented as 
(13)
where y∈{L,S} and y≠x, and
where denotes a cost
function of the firm x, Qy
* is an optimal response of the competitor, and N=NL+ NS.
Since in the steady state the firms are identical in all respects (after certain number of
periods following integration informational asymmetry between firms disappears), the
optimal steady state strategies of both firms operating in integrated market are given as
(see Appendix A2 for the proof)
, (14)
. (15)
However, in the first several periods after integration informational differences
(resulted from the past market research) will affect the market behavior of the firms. To
show it, assume that in the period following integration both firms found their optimal
steady state strategies characterized by the optimal steady state output and optimal
15
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steady state standard deviation. To achieve the long run knowledge of the market
corresponding to the optimal steady state standard deviation, starting from the first
period after integration each firm has to devote the same resources to market research.
Thus, after integration both firms will face the same cost of market research, but in the
transition period, due to the knowledge of the market accumulated in the past, the firm
operating prior to integration on the large market (L) will be able to predict market
demand better than the firm (S) operating before integration on the smaller market. In
particular, in the period following integration market information of both firms will be
summarized by standard deviations σL° and σS° such that σL°<σS° (fully determined by
the results of market research accumulated in the past). Consequently, in the first period
after integration firm x (x∈{L,S}) will face the following optimization problem
(16)
where x,y∈{L,S}and y≠x, Qy
* is an optimal response of the competitor, σx° is a parameter
determined by past behavior, c is a marginal cost, Gx
* is the optimal steady state cost of
market research, and N=NL+ NS. The solution to the optimization problem above can
be represented as (see Appendix A3)
(17)
Since σL<σS, the optimal output of the firm operating before integration on the large
market QL
* is greater than the optimal output of the firm operating before integration in
the smaller market QS
*. In the extreme case, when firms are very risk averse (k is high)
or/and the difference in the quality of the demand predictions is significant (i.e., the
difference between σS° and σL°  is high enough), the firm operating before integration in
the smaller market would find it optimal to produce nothing. However, to be able to
survive in the market in the future this firm will have to conduct costly market research.
Therefore, in the first period after integration firm S may have to make loses in order to
survive in the market in the long run. Similar situation may happen in several subsequent
periods (until the prediction of the demand is done based only on the market data
collected after integration, and both firms predict demand with the same quality).
Loses associated with the low level of output and costly market research in the first
several periods after integration may cause the firm, which has not been aware of an
16
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unavoidable information asymmetry, to quit the market. Note, however, that it could not
be the case, if the firm operating in the small market and anticipating informational
problems after integration, devotes some additional resources to market research in pre-
integration periods (sacrifices some profit before integration) in order to prepare itself
for the long term operations in the large market.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this contribution was to examine the possible impact of market
research and demand forecasting prior to integration on the industry structure in unified
market. The analysis focused on a single commodity monopolistic markets with uncertain
demand in small and large countries. The results derived indicate that risk-averse firms
always devote resources to demand forecasting, and, in particular, that the optimal
demand forecasting strategies of the firms (operating in infinite time and maximizing the
expected utility from profit) are stationary, i.e., the same resources should be devoted to
market analysis in each period. Moreover, the analysis shows that the optimal amount of
resources devoted to market research is proportional to the market size (i.e., firms
operating in a larger market devote more resources to the market analysis than firms
operating in the smaller one). It implies that firms operating before integration in different
markets have different information about the integrated market demand just after
integration (firms operating in a larger market have much better information about the
integrated market than firms operating in the smaller one). Since the investment in
market research made in the past (embodied in data about demand fluctuations in the
past) lowers the cost of current forecasts, firms coming from larger markets have a cost
advantage (even if there is no difference in production and data-processing technology).
Moreover, informational asymmetry (just after integration) affect the structure of the
integrated market. In particular, if fluctuations of demand are large enough, highly risk-
averse firms joining European common market can find that the best they could do would
be to quit the market. At the same time analogous firms already operating on the
common market (which are able to predict integrated market demand with smaller
variance of the prediction error) can still make profit. Informational asymmetry can be
depleted (or fully eliminated) if a small country's firms analyze European market before
integration. Such necessity, however, needs to be recognized and supported by policy
makers of both European Union and entering countries.
17
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Steady state utility maximization problem of monopolistic firm
operating in the single commodity market with stochastic demand
The objective function of the monopolistic firm  x (x∈{L,S}) can be approximated as
(A1.1.)
where Qx denotes the volume of output supplied, and σx is the steady state standard
deviation of demand. The first order conditions to the above optimization problem can
be represented as
(A1.2)
(A1.3.)
The second order conditions to this maximization problem require the Hessian of the
objective function 
(A1.4.)
to be negative definite (it guarantees that the objective function is strictly concave). This
Hessian is negative-definite (the objective function is strictly concave) iff
and . (A1.5.)
Taking derivatives and rearranging, we conclude that the second order conditions are
satisfied iff
, (A1.6.)
18
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 36 – J. Cukrowski, M.M. Fischer
 )]
lnln
(cQ)
2N
Q
N
b
(a[Qu
2
1
 x0x
x
x
x
x
x1xx
x
max λ
σ
λ
σ
pi
σ)σ,(Ψ
σ,
−−−−−≡x
xQ
Q
}, )u(u)]
lnln
(cQ)
2N
Q
N
b
(a[Q{u
2
1 0
x21
x0
x
x
x
x
x
x2 Πλ
σ
λ
σ
pi
σ
−+−−−+−+
0c)
2N
Q
N
b
2(au
2
1
c)
2N
Q
N
b
2(au
2
1
Q
)(Q
x
x
x
x
2
x
x
x
x
1
x
xxx
=−+−+−−−=
pi
σ
pi
σ
∂
σ,Ψ∂
0)
1
2N
Q
(u
2
1
)
1
2N
Q
(u
2
1)(Q
xx
x
2
xx
x
1
x
xxx
=+++−= λσpiλσpi∂σ
σ,Ψ∂










2
x
xxx
2
xx
xxx
2
xx
xxx
2
2
x
xxx
2
)(Q
Q
)(Q
Q
)(Q
Q
)(Q
∂σ
σ,Ψ∂
∂σ∂
σ,Ψ∂
∂σ∂
σ,Ψ∂
∂
σ,Ψ∂
0
Q
)(Q
2
x
xxx
2
<
∂
σ,Ψ∂
0
Q
)(Q)(Q
Q
)(Q
2
xx
xxx
2
2
x
xxx
2
2
x
xxx
2
>



−
∂σ∂
σ,Ψ∂
∂σ
σ,Ψ∂
∂
σ,Ψ∂
2
x
x
)(k
bN4
σ
pi
λ <
where k=(u1-u2)/(u1+u2), k∈(0,1) for the risk averse firm.
Rearranging the first order conditions, we obtain two possible values of output which
maximize the objective function considered
, (A1.7.)
, (A1.8.)
assuming that , i.e., 
. (A1.9.)
If λ goes to infinity (the current technology is very advanced), the firm knows demand
almost perfectly, and the optimal volume of output goes to optimal volume of output
without uncertainty (a-c)/(2b/Nx). Consequently, the optimal quantity of output supplied
Qx
* is determined by the first expression i.e., Qx
*= Qx,1.
Steady state standard deviation which maximizes the objective function considered is
given as 
. (A1.10)
Taking into account condition (A1.9), plugging (A1.10) into inequality (A1.6) and 
rearranging we get that if , Qx
* and σx
* correspond to the maximum 
of the objective function.
Appendix 2. Steady state utility maximization problem of firms operating in
integrated market with stochastic demand
Since both firms operating in the market are identical and in the long run there is no
any difference determined by past behavior (each firm supplies Qx), the objective function
of firm  x (x∈{L,S}) can be approximated as
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(A2.1)
where Qx denotes the volume of output supplied, and σx is the steady state standard
deviation of demand. The first order conditions to the above optimization problem can
be represented as
, (A2.2)
. (A2.3)
The second order conditions to this maximization problem require the Hessian of the
objective function to be negative definite (it guarantees that the objective function is
strictly concave). The Hessian is negative-definite (the objective function is strictly
concave) iff
and .   (A2.4)
Taking derivatives and rearranging, we conclude that the second order conditions are
satisfied iff
, (A2.5)
where k=(u1-u2)/(u1+u2), k∈(0,1) for the risk averse firm.
Rearranging the first order conditions, we obtain two possible values of output which
maximize the objective function considered
, (A2.6)
, (A2.7)
assuming that that , i.e.,
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If λ goes to infinity, the firm knows demand almost perfectly, and the optimal volume of
output goes to optimal volume of output without uncertainty (a-c)/4b/N. Consequently,
the optimal quantity of output supplied Qx
* is determined by the first expression i.e.,
Qx
*= Qx,1
Steady state standard deviation which maximizes the objective function (A2.1) is
given as
. (A2.9)
Taking into account condition (A2.8), plugging (A2.9) into inequality (A2.5) and 
rearranging we get that  if   , Qx
* and sx
* correspond to the maximum of
the objective function.
Appendix 3. The utility maximization problem of firms operating in the
integrated market with stochastic demand in the period following integration
The objective function of the monopolistic firm  x (x∈{L,S}) can be approximated as
(A3.1)
where Qx denotes the volume of output supplied to the market by the firm x, Qy
* is an
optimal output response of the competing firm (y∈{L,S} and y≠x), and σx° denotes
standard deviation of market demand determined based on the results computed prior
to integration, Gx
* is the optimal steady state cost of market research. The first order
conditions to the above optimization problem can be represented as
(A3.3)
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Solving the system of equations specified by the expression above when x=L (y=S) and
x=S (y=L), we get [10]
, (A3.4)
where k=(u1-u2)/(u1+u2), k∈(0,1) for the risk averse firm.
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[10] Note, that for x,y∈{L, S} and y≠x ,  , 
consequently, volumes of output of both firms are strategic substitutes.
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